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Abs t rac t  
This paper provides an introductory review of the alternative possible income 
distributions which can be used when making cross-sectional evaluations of the 
effects of taxes and transfers using a household economic survey. This paper 
attempts to clarify the various alternatives, both for users of data and those wishing 
to interpret results. Special attention is given to the choice of income unit. The need 
to avoid spurious comparisons is stressed. The use of adult equivalence scales and 
the application of an explicit sharing rule are considered. Comparisons over time, 
where both the tax structure and the populations differ, are also considered. 
Numerical examples are used to highlight the alternative approaches and 
distributions.  
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1  In t roduc t ion  
Many government policies are designed to advance a redistributive objective. Many 
other policies may not have redistribution as their aim, but could have distributional 
consequences which need to be evaluated. Furthermore, a wide range of changes - 
including for example those affecting relative prices, or labour and asset markets, 
along with demographic change and the structure of households - can have 
substantial distributional effects. Understanding impacts on inequality and poverty is 
therefore likely to play a central role in evaluating policies and outcomes. 
 
When attempting to compare distributions using measures of inequality and poverty, 
important decisions must first be made regarding three major elements, referred to 
as: ‘what, when and whose’. First, a choice must be made regarding precisely what is 
to be measured; this is often referred to as the ‘metric’ or ‘welfare metric’. For 
example, this may be pre-tax incomes, wage rates, or a measure of expenditure or 
consumption. In some cases the welfare metric may even attempt to allow for the 
value of leisure.
2
  
 
Second the accounting period, or time period over which the selected ‘welfare metric’ 
is measured, must be chosen. This may be a week, year or even lifetime, depending 
on the context. A longer accounting period avoids difficulties arising from transitory 
changes, or variations arising from age differences which may not be regarded as 
relevant for inequality comparisons. For example, two individuals could have the 
same lifetime incomes but different time profiles of their annual incomes. However, 
data limitations often exist when attempting to extend the accounting period. The use 
of a longer period also introduces the role of systematic relative mobility.3 
Judgements about inequality may be closely related to judgements about mobility.   
 
The third decision concerns the unit of analysis. This could be, for example, the 
family, the household, or the individual. Indeed, both the welfare metric and the 
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   The metric is usually a one-dimensional measure, although multi-dimensional approaches can also be taken. The 
present paper concentrates on comparisons of one-dimensional metrics.  
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  On longer accounting periods see, for example, Creedy (1997a, b). 
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income unit could be artificial measures, designed to allow for differences in the 
composition of households and involving the concept of an ‘equivalent adult’.4 
Assumptions about income sharing within households and families are also often 
used, and these need to be treated with care. 
 
These choices are in some ways related. For example, if a longer accounting period 
is used, household and family structures change over time, so that it is more 
appropriate to consider individuals as the basic unit. The choice of a particular 
welfare metric may also suggest a particular unit of analysis. The choices depend on 
the precise nature of the basic question motivating the analysis. A crucial point to 
recognise is that ultimately these choices cannot avoid the use of value judgements. 
The view is taken here that the role of the professional economist is to examine the 
implications of adopting alternative value judgements, so it is very important to make 
these as explicit as possible.  
 
Even a cursory examination of publications involving inequality and poverty 
comparisons shows that, in reporting results, decisions regarding the welfare metric, 
the unit of analysis and the time period are frequently given scant attention. Often the 
term ‘income’ is used without being clearly defined. It is all too easy to make spurious 
comparisons between distributions. Many publications make only a limited number of 
comparisons, despite the fact, stressed above, that value judgements are involved at 
every stage. 
 
The limited aim of this paper is therefore to provide an introductory review of the 
range of alternative possible distributions based on single-dimensional metrics which 
are variants of income and consumption concepts.5 This paper attempts to clarify the 
various alternatives, both for users of data and those wishing to interpret results. 
Inequality comparisons nearly always give rise to technical and data difficulties, 
though these are outside the scope of the present paper. 
                                               
4  This is considered in more detail in Section 2 below. 
5
  Hence, the use of a concept of ‘money metric utility’, where incomes are affected by the tax structure via labour 
supply variations, is not considered here as this raises a different set of problems. These are considered by, for 
example, Donaldson (1992) , Aaberge and Colombino (2008), Ericson and Flood (2009) and Decoster and Haan 
(2010) where there are heterogeneous preferences; see also Creedy and Hérault (2012). 
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Cross-sectional comparisons using a household economic survey are considered. 
Hence, the accounting period is necessarily a single period (typically a year or 
shorter). The contexts discussed here include analyses of the redistributive effects of 
direct taxes and transfers, along with the effects of indirect taxes. In addition, ‘fiscal 
incidence’ studies attempt to allocate some items of government expenditure, such 
as health and education, to individuals as well as considering the effects of indirect 
taxes, direct taxes and transfers. In allocating such expenditure, the view is therefore 
taken that it relates to publicly provided (tax financed) private goods.6 Simple 
hypothetical numerical examples are used to highlight the alternative approaches 
and distributions.  
 
It should also be remembered that any measures of redistribution, measured in terms 
of a move from pre-tax to post-tax (and transfer) incomes, need to be interpreted with 
caution because the structure of taxes and benefits, and of government 
expenditures, itself influences the pre-tax distribution.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces a hypothetical 
population consisting of just four households, chosen to illustrate the range of 
distributions which can be obtained. It describes the role of adult equivalence scales, 
designed to deal with the fact that individuals are not homogeneous, and of explicit 
sharing rules whereby total household income is allocated among all members of that 
household. Section 3 reports various measures of redistribution and progressivity for 
a range of comparisons. Section 4 examines the additional difficulties involved in 
making inequality comparisons over time. In particular, both the tax and transfer 
system and the population structure (for example the age distribution of the 
population) can change over time. It is therefore useful to be able to disentangle the 
separate effects of tax and demographic changes. Brief conclusions are in Section 5.  
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   This is of course debatable. It may, for example, be thought that such expenditure gives rise to considerable 
externalities. Furthermore, some people may argue that health expenditure devoted to children could instead be 
added to the welfare metric of parents, who would otherwise need to pay for the care. 
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2  A Hypo the t i ca l  Popu la t ion  
To make the various ideas and comparisons concrete, it is useful to construct a small 
hypothetical dataset. Suppose there are just four households, which is a sufficient 
number for present purposes. In order to reduce the number of possible comparisons 
here, households and families are considered to be synonymous; the term 
‘household’ is used throughout to refer to an income unit, consisting of one or more 
individuals, within which resources may be shared.  
 
The left-hand block of Table 1 shows the hypothetical market incomes of members of 
the households in the relevant period. The term ‘market income’ here refers to an 
individual’s income from all sources, such as labour income, self-employment income 
and the ownership of assets (including rental and interest income, and so on). In 
some contexts, emphasis may of course be on a particular source, such as wage and 
salary income from employment. Market income is necessarily assigned to 
individuals.  
 
In Table 1, a dash indicates that there is no one in the particular cell, while zero 
indicates that the person has no market income. Thus household 1 consists of one 
adult (A1) with a market income of 100, while household 2 consists of two adults (A1 
and A2) with market incomes of 60 and 40 respectively. Household 3 has one child 
(C1) and household 4 has two children (C1 and C2). The incomes of the adult 
individuals have been deliberately chosen so that total household market income is 
100 for each household. Non-income differences, other than the demographic 
structure of households, are not considered relevant here. However, in practice 
judgements may well depend on other features of individuals and income sources.  
 
The right-hand block of Table 1 shows the hypothetical disposable incomes of each 
individual, after the application of the income tax and transfer (or benefit) system. 
This system, which need not be specified in detail for present purposes, is 
progressive in form. The worker (adult A1) in household 4 is assumed to have a 
higher disposable income than the single individual in household 1, despite having 
the same market income. This can be considered to result from some kind of in-work 
payment related to children. Adult A2 in household 3 has a higher disposable income 
than market income, also reflecting the nature of the benefit system. 
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Table 1 Individual Gross and Disposable Incomes 
 Market income   Disposable Income 
HH A1 A2 C1 C2  A1 A2 C1 C2 
1 100 - - -  80 - - - 
2 60 40 - -  45 35 - - 
3 75 25 0 -  70 30 0 - 
4 100 0 0 0  90 0 0 0 
 
 
A range of income distributions may be considered based on the market and 
disposable incomes of Table 1. If the focus of attention is on individual market 
incomes, the distribution has six non-zero observations and is:  
[100, 60, 40, 75, 25, 100],  
where elements are arranged by taking each household, and adults within 
households from Table 1, in turn. Here the zero incomes of relevant adults and 
children are necessarily excluded from the population of market incomes. This 
distribution may be compared with that of the six individual disposables incomes, 
given by:  
[80, 45, 35, 70, 30, 90].  
If concern is primarily with how the market distributes the flow of income, and the way 
this is altered by the tax and transfer system, these distributions containing six 
observations are the focus of analysis. However, there is clearly a complex 
relationship between the distribution of market incomes and inequality in the 
distribution of resources, as more widely perceived, over all individuals in the 
population. This relationship clearly depends on the incomes of partners and the 
treatment of those without market incomes.  
 
If concern is with comparisons of total market income among households, rather than 
individuals, the distribution has just four observations of:  
[100, 100, 100, 100],  
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where elements are arranged by taking each household in turn. Inequality is in this 
case clearly zero. There is a corresponding distribution of household disposable 
income, with the household as unit of analysis, of:  
[80, 80, 90, 100].  
In this case, because the benefits available in the tax and transfer system depend on 
the existence of children, the use of the household as unit of analysis suggests that 
the structure introduces inequality. In practice the distributions are likely to show a 
reduction in inequality, but this example shows why the comparison between these 
two distributions, having the household as the unit of analysis, may not be very 
instructive.  
 
Nevertheless, it should be recognised that – given the ubiquitous role of value 
judgements - some people may actually take the view that household structure is 
irrelevant in making comparisons. They would object to the special treatment of 
household composition by the tax and benefit structure and would judge that taxes 
and transfers (in this example) have indeed increased inequality. Those who take this 
view may, for example, object to treating children in terms merely of a cost or burden 
faced by parents, rather than as a desired benefit or advantage. They may consider 
household structure, fertility decisions, household production and market income as 
jointly determined to a considerable extent.  
 
2.1  Adul t  Equ iva lence Sca les  
This subsection considers a method of dealing with the heterogeneity of households. 
A common approach, given only the market and disposable incomes, is to make 
comparisons on the basis, not of observed actual income either of households or 
individuals, but of an artificial income construct which reflects the differences in the 
demographic structure of the households. The simplest way to convert household 
income into a measure of income per person is clearly to divide total income by the 
number of individuals in the household. But the view is widely taken that not all 
members of the household have the same consumption needs. Furthermore, there 
may be economies of scale within a household. The latter can arise because some 
goods (including some durables and goods like heating and lighting) may be ‘public 
goods’ within the household; thus those goods can be consumed simultaneously by 
7  
 
several people. In addition, there may be economies from purchasing larger 
quantities of some goods.  
 
Instead of dividing total household income by the number of people in the household 
(irrespective of their ages or gender), a measure of household size can be obtained 
by giving each person a separate weight, using a set of ‘adult equivalence scales’. 
Such scales are typically imposed by the analyst and are based, loosely speaking, on 
perceived relative needs of different types of individual in the household and 
economies of scale within the household. However, value judgements cannot be 
avoided in the choice of scales. In practice they are often taken from other studies, 
often relating to other countries, without consideration of their rationale. Equivalence 
scales are also implicit in the tax and transfer system, but of course it could not be 
implied that they are consciously used (and the system is typically made up of a 
range of overlapping benefits).7  
 
A simple but very flexible adult equivalence scale is the following, where, an  and cn  
denote respectively the number of adults and children in the household, and m is the 
adult equivalent size of the household:8 
 
 ( )a cm n n αθ= +  (1) 
 
Here θ  and 1α ≤  are parameters reflecting the relative ‘cost’ of a child and 
economies of scale respectively. Using (1), with 0.5 and 0.8θ α= = , the equivalent 
sizes of the four hypothetical households are respectively: 1; 1.74; 2.08; and 2.41. 
 
Having obtained the adult equivalent size of each household, it is then a simple 
matter to obtain the total income per adult equivalent person.  The resulting gross 
and disposable income per adult equivalent for each household is shown in Table 2. 
It can be seen that the movement from market income per adult equivalent to 
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  For an example of the calculation of implicit scales, see van de Ven and Creedy (2005). 
8  This form was suggested by Cutler and Katz (1992) and Jenkins and Cowell (1994). For an analysis of a wide 
range of scales using this formula, see Creedy and Sleeman (2005).  
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disposable income per adult equivalent involves a ‘reranking’ of households 2 and 3, 
if the households are ranked in ascending order.  
 
Table 2 Household Income per Adult Equivalent Person 
      
Household m   Gross 
income/m 
 Disposable 
income/m 
1 1  100  80 
2 1.74  57.5  46.0 
3 2.08  48.1  48.1 
4 2.41  41.5  37.34 
 
 
The further assumption is made that each member of the household receives the 
income per adult equivalent person; this is the new welfare metric. It is clearly an 
artificial contruct. Comparisons then depend on the choice of unit of analysis in 
combination with this welfare metric. It turns out that this choice is not as 
straightforward as has often been assumed. In fact, three further pairs of distributions 
may be considered. First, comparisons can be made using the household as the 
basic unit of analysis (as with the first two distributions considered in the previous 
subsection): this approach compares  
[100, 57.5, 48.1, 41.5]  
with  
[80, 46.0, 48.10, 37.34].  
However, the rationale for this choice of unit is not entirely clear.  
 
Second, perhaps the simplest and most natural choice is to make comparisons using 
the individual as the basic unit of analysis. This compares the distribution  
[100, 57.5, 57.5, 48.1, 48.1, 48.1, 41.5, 41.5, 41.5, 41.5]  
with  
[80, 46.0, 46.0, 48.1, 48.1, 48.1, 37.34, 37.34, 37.34, 37.34].  
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Here the elements are ordered by taking each household and individual in turn from 
Table 1. Again it can be seen that some reranking of individuals is involved when 
comparing the two distributions: this is discussed further in Section 3 below. 
 
When using the individual as the unit of analysis, each person ‘counts for one’ 
irrespective of the household to which they belong. Inequality remains unchanged 
when one person is replaced by another person with the same metric (income per 
adult equivalent) but belonging to a different type of household. It thereby satisfies an 
‘anonymity principle’. However, it does not necessarily satisfy the ‘principle of 
transfers’.9 This principle is the inequality-disliking value judgement which takes the 
view (in the context of homogeneous individuals) that an income transfer from a 
richer to a poorer individual (which leaves the relative rank of the two people 
unchanged) is judged to reduce inequality and represent an improvement.10 But if rich 
large households are highly efficient at generating welfare (in terms of the choice of 
this metric), given large economies of scale, it is possible, when using the individual 
as unit, for evaluations to be inequality-preferring.  
 
A third possibility uses the equivalent adult as the income unit. This artificial income 
unit is thus combined with its corresponding artificial income measure, income per 
adult equivalent. In this case there are not necessarily integer numbers of equivalent 
adults (except for the single-adult, who is household number 1 in Table 1) and the 
distributions cannot be written simply as vectors. Thus the equivalent adult size must 
be treated as a household weight in obtaining inequality or other measures. To 
illustrate this case, the arithmetic mean gross adult equivalent income per adult 
equivalent person, denoted y , is: 
 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )
100 1.74 57.5 2.08 48.1 2.41 41.5
1 1.74 2.08 2.41
y
+ + +  
=
+ + +
   (2) 
 
The use of the artificial equivalent adult as the unit of analysis means that the income 
unit and the income concept are treated consistently. Each individual’s contribution to 
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  This was first pointed out by Glewwe (1991).  
10  Although the implications of adopting this principle have been widely investigated, it is important always to keep 
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inequality depends on the demographic structure of the household to which that 
individual belongs.11 Thus an adult in a one-person household ‘counts for one’. But 
an adult counts for ‘less than one’ (has a weight less than 1) when placed in a multi-
person household.  
 
Importantly, the use of this income unit is consistent with the principle of transfers, 
described above. This can be useful because there are general results linking this 
value judgement to Lorenz curves, which are widely used to depict distributions. For 
an individual income distribution, first arrange individuals in ascending order, that is 
from lowest to highest income. The Lorenz curve plots the cumulative proportion of 
people (on the horizontal axis) against the cumulative proportion of total income (on 
the vertical axis of the diagram).  
 
Consider the Lorenz curves of two distributions which have the same arithmetic 
mean income. Suppose the Lorenz curve of one distribution, say A, lies everywhere 
inside the other distribution, say B: that is, A’s curve is closer to the upward sloping 
diagonal line of equality which arises if all incomes are equal. One way that 
distributions can be evaluated is as follows. For a distribution ( )1 2, ,..., nx x x , suppose 
the evaluation function – representing the value judgements of an independent judge 
- takes the form, ( )
1
n
i
i
W U x
=
=∑ , where ( )iU x  is a concave function representing the 
contribution of individual i ’s income to W. The concavity of U reflects adherence to 
the principle of transfers and the degree of concavity reflects the extent of aversion to 
inequality.12 It has been established that all functions of this general kind would judge 
the first distribution to be better than the second in that it gives a higher value of W.13 
This result is true irrespective of the precise extent of aversion to inequality.  
 
If the arithmetic means of the two distributions differ, the same result applies instead 
to the concept of the Generalised Lorenz curve: this plots the product of the 
                                               
11 Its use was first suggested by Ebert (1997). For detailed analysis of the choice of income unit, see Shorrocks 
(2004).  
12
   An evaluation function of this type is commonly referred to as an additive, individualistic and Paretian ‘social 
welfare function’. Despite the name, it does not represent society’s views, but those of a single person who is not 
part of the distribution but who is making the evaluation.  
13
   This result was established by Atkinson (1970).  
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proportion of total income and the arithmetic mean income against the corresponding 
proportion of people. Thus the vertical axis of the Lorenz curve is ‘stretched’ by an 
amount depending on the arithmetic mean. 
 
Importantly, it cannot be assumed that comparisons are insensitive to the choice of 
income unit. Indeed, it is quite possible for a tax reform to be judged differently, 
changing inequality and welfare comparisons in opposite directions, when using the 
individual and the equivalent adult as income units.14  
 
The discussion has so far been in terms of distributions of market and disposable 
incomes. Some household surveys contain detailed information about household 
expenditures, and this can be used to compute an additional metric, that of 
disposable income after the deduction of indirect taxes. If the indirect tax system has 
considerable selectivity, this task is complicated by the need for detailed expenditure 
data for each category. But if there is a broad-based goods and services tax (such as 
a value-added tax), perhaps combined with limited excises (for example, on tobacco, 
alcohol and petrol), the allocation is less complex.15 Hence additional distributions 
can be produced in terms of a welfare metric described as ‘income after direct taxes 
and transfers and after indirect taxes’. However, no new basic issues arise in terms 
of choice of income unit or equivalence scale. For this reason, this metric is not 
considered separately here. 
 
2.2  The  Use  o f  A l loca t ion  Rules  
In the previous subsection the welfare metric was based on an assumption of equal 
sharing within the household to produce the measure of income per adult equivalent 
person. Further distinctions were then made depending on the choice of income unit. 
Yet another approach is to use an explicit sharing rule to allocate disposable income 
to individual members of each household. The particular sharing rule used may be 
based on special surveys which provide information about income sharing, or it may 
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  Examples are given by Decoster and Ooge (2002) and Creedy and Scutella (2004).  
15  For example, if x denotes expenditure by an individual and v is the tax-exclusive indirect tax rate, then the 
corresponding tax-inclusive rate is v/(1+v) and expenditure after the deduction of tax is x/(1+v). 
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be rather more ad hoc.16 Suppose that the allocation rule is based on an additive 
household size, s, defined as: 
 ( )1 0.5 1 0.3a cs n n= + − +  (3) 
 
Hence the first adult is given a weight of 1, while all other adults are given a weight of 
0.5 and all children are given a weight of 0.3. These values are chosen arbitrarily, 
merely for illustrative purposes.17 For example, household 2 has a total disposable 
income of 45+35=80. The size of this household for sharing purposes is 1.5, so the 
amount allocated to the first adult is 80/1.5=53, and the amount allocated to the 
second adult is (0.5)(80)/1.5=27. Using this approach, the distribution of individual 
disposable incomes is shown in the left-hand panel of Table 3.  
 
Table 3 Individual Post-Sharing Disposable and Final Incomes 
 Disposable income  Final income 
 A1 A2 C1 C2  A1 A2 C1 C2 
1 80 - - -  78 - - - 
2 53 27 - -  58 34 - - 
3 55 28 17 -  60 35 25 - 
4 43 21 13 13  49 30 22 22 
 
 
This type of explicit income-sharing rule is naturally associated with the use of the 
individual as the income unit. The distribution of individual disposable income, after 
application of the sharing rule, is thus:  
[80, 53, 27, 55, 28, 17, 43, 21, 13, 13].  
In examining the redistributive effect of taxes and transfers, care is then needed in 
selecting the comparison distribution of gross or pre-tax incomes. For example, 
comparing the above individual distribution with market income per adult equivalent 
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 Early studies of income sharing include Lazear and Michael (1988), Jenkins (1991) and Borooah and McKee 
(1994). See also Bonke and Browning (2003).  
17 These values coincidentally correspond to the ‘after housing costs’ adult equivalence scales used by the OECD.  
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person, on an individual basis, would retain the same number of observations but 
would be spurious.18 This is because each household’s adult equivalent income is 
assumed to be obtained equally by each individual in the household: as shown 
above, that distribution is:  
[100, 57.5, 57.5, 48.1, 48.1, 48.1, 41.5, 41.5, 41.5, 41.5].  
The closest comparison is obtained by constructing an individual distribution of 
market income, on the similar (though again artificial) assumption that market income 
is shared, though of course the tax and transfer system is not applied to the shared 
market incomes. This distribution is found to be:  
[100, 67, 33, 55, 28, 17, 48, 24, 14, 14]. 
 
As mentioned earlier, it is sometimes possible to allow for indirect taxes and thus to 
construct an additional distribution of (individual) disposable income after the 
deduction of existing indirect taxes. This is somewhat more complex than when adult 
equivalent scales are used, because certain goods (such as alcohol and tobacco) 
need to be attributed to adults, while other goods (such as children’s clothing) are 
necessarily consumed by children. This distribution is again not treated separately 
here, only because it raises no special issues from the point of view of comparisons.  
 
Fiscal incidence studies go further and attempt to allocate some components of 
government expenditure to individuals. In particular, health expenditure can be 
allocated based on age, gender and summary information about individuals’ use of 
publicly financed health services. Similarly primary, secondary and tertiary education 
expenditure can be allocated to individuals based on age.19  
 
The right-hand block of Table 3 shows a hypothetical distribution of ‘final’ income 
resulting from the allocation of some government expenditure and the deduction of 
indirect taxes. These numbers again are not based on specific assumed policies but 
reflect for example the tendency for children to benefit most from education and 
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  This is true even if the sharing or allocation structure in (3) were also used as the adult equivalence scales.  
19  There would of course be little point in obtaining a measure of final income per adult equivalent (by aggregating 
the individual final incomes in the household and then dividing by the number of adult equivalents) since, for 
example, education benefits cannot be thought of as being shared equally within the household. However, in a 
wider context the absence of tax-financed government expenditure of this kind would require an intra-household 
transfer.  
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health policies (and, by assumption, the adults are of working age). The distribution 
of final income, with the individual as unit of analysis, is thus:  
[78, 58, 34, 60, 35, 25, 49, 30, 22, 22]. 
 
3  Inequa l i t y  and  Tax  Progr ess iv i t y  
This section summarises the various distributions discussed in the previous section 
and presents the resulting inequality and tax progressivity measures. 
3.1  Th i r teen  D is t r ibu t ions  
The various distributions discussed in the previous section can be summarised in 
Table 4. This shows thirteen distributions although, as discussed above, these could 
easily be extended by treating indirect taxes separately, both using adult equivalent 
scales and the explicit sharing or allocation rule.20  
 
The number of households is H; the number of individuals in household i is in ; the 
adult equivalent size of household i is im ; and the number of individuals with positive 
market income is WN . The number of individuals is 
1
H
i
i
N n
=
=∑  and the number of 
adult equivalents is 
1
H
E i
i
N m
=
=∑ .  
 
The numerical example was constructed so that the four hypothetical households 
have the same total market income of 100. After the application of a progressive tax 
and transfer system, the four household disposable incomes are:  
[80, 80, 100, 90].  
Hence many people would argue that a comparison of the inequality of distributions 1 
and 2 from Table 4 would serve little value; tax and transfer systems are designed to 
allow for differences in the demographic structure of households. Hence a simple 
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  Hence there could be three distributions (for three income units) of income per adult equivalent after direct taxes 
and transfers and the deduction of indirect taxes, plus a distribution of individual post tax and transfers income 
after sharing and the deduction of indirect taxes.  
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comparison of this kind, which ignores differences in household composition, would 
be meaningless (in this example it would suggest that the tax structure is inequality 
increasing). However, as discussed in Section 2, not everyone would agree with this 
judgement.  
 
 
Table 4 Alternative Distributions 
No.  Welfare metric Unit Sharing  No of 
Units 
1  Total market HH income Household N/A H 
2  Total disposable HH income Household N/A H 
3  Total market HH inc per adult equiv Household N/A H 
4  Total disp HH inc per adult equiv Household N/A H 
5  Total market HH inc per adult equiv Individual Equal N 
6  Total disp HH inc per adult equiv Individual Equal N 
7  Total market HH inc per adult equiv Equiv indiv Equal EN  
8  Total disp HH inc per adult equiv Equiv indiv Equal EN  
9  Individual market income Individual No WN  
10  Indiv disposable income Individual No WN  
11  Individual market income  Individual Yes N 
12  Individual disposable income Individual Yes N 
13  Individual final income Individual Yes N 
 
 
3.2  Redis t r ibu t i ve  Ef fec ts  
Table 4 shows that a range of possible comparisons exists. Another comparison 
(other than of distributions 1 and 2) involving the household as unit is between 
distributions 3 and 4 (that is, pre- and post-tax-and-transfer incomes), each of which 
adjusts household incomes using adult equivalence scales. Various inequality 
1 6  
 
measures could then be computed. In some cases they are linked with a particular 
‘social welfare function’, reflecting the value judgements of an independent observer, 
and a degree of inequality aversion can be specified.21 In practice it is valuable to 
examine results using a range of measures, thereby considering the effects of 
adopting different value judgements.  
 
However, for present purposes, where the emphasis is on the various distributions 
rather than the precise measurement of inequality, it is sufficient to use a single 
inequality measure. Results are reported for the standard well-known Gini measure. 
This can be calculated in a variety of ways, but a convenient form is the following, 
where ix  denotes unit i ’s income, x  is arithmetic mean, and individuals are 
arranged in ascending order: 
 
 ( )2
1
1 21 1
n
i
x
i
xG n i
n n x
=
 
= + − + −  
 
∑  (3) 
 
The Gini inequality measures of distributions 3 and 4 are shown in the first row of 
Table 5. Although the adjusted household income measures are to some extent more 
comparable than with distributions 1 and 2, this comparison ignores the number of 
individuals involved.  
 
Comparisons between two distributions of market and disposable income per adult 
equivalent, which allow for the differing compositions of the households, are between 
numbers 5 and 6 (using the individual as unit) and between 7 and 8 (using the 
equivalent adult as unit) in Table 4. The Gini comparisons are reported in Table 5.  
 
The simplest comparison is of the effect of the tax and transfer system on the market 
and disposable incomes of those individuals who have some market income; this 
compares distributions 9 and 10.22 However, this comparison would suggest some 
                                               
21
  For a short introduction see, for example, Creedy (1999), and for extensive analysis, see Lambert (1992).  
22  There may be a temptation to include all individuals, and hence zero incomes for those not working. It is not clear 
why one would wish to add zero values and of course the resulting inequality measures are much higher. In the 
present example, the addition of 4 zeros to each of the distributions 9 and 10 produces Gini values of 0.5425 and 
0.5314 respectively.  
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horizontal inequity in that the two individuals with market incomes of 100 (in 
households 1 and 4) are treated differently. This judgement clearly ignores the fact 
that the tax and particularly the transfer structure does not regard the two individuals 
as being similar, a fact which is ignored when only those with positive market 
incomes are considered.  
 
 
 
Table 5 Gini Inequality Measures 
Distributions     
Before and after 
Gini    
before 
Gini               
after 
Reduction (per cent) 
3 and 4 0.1871 0.1538 0.0333       (18 %) 
5 and 6 0.1405 0.1171 0.0234       (17 %) 
7 and 8 0.1371 0.1125 0.0246       (18 %) 
9 and 10 0.2375 0.2190 0.0185       (8 %) 
11 and 12 0.3530 0.3269 0.0261       (7 %) 
11 and 13 0.3530 0.2404 0.1126       (32 %) 
12 and 13 0.3269 0.2404 0.0864       (26 %) 
 
 
Consider comparisons which allow for the allocation of indirect taxes and some items 
of government expenditure. Since the use of an income sharing or income allocation 
rule (which differs from the use of an adult-equivalence scale) is crucial, the 
comparisons are necessarily based on the individual as the unit of analysis. 
Comparisons are thus between distributions 11 and 12, between 12 and 13 and 
between 11 and 13. These are also reported in Table 5, along with the percentage 
reductions. Clearly any judgement about the redistributive effects of taxes and 
transfers, and of some components of government expenditure, depends crucially on 
which comparisons are selected. 
 
The comparisons moving from a measure of market income to disposable income 
are obtained by comparing distributions 3 to 4; 5 to 6; 7 to 8; 9 to 10; and 11 to 12. 
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The last two comparisons reveal much smaller percentage reductions in the Gini 
inequality measure than the first three. Of those using adult equivalence scales (the 
first three) the absolute Gini values differ slightly although in this case there are small 
differences in percentage reductions. However, in practice it is possible for the use of 
different income units to come to different, even opposite, conclusions about the 
effects of a tax change.  
 
The allocation of some government expenditure to individuals (comparisons involving 
distribution 13) produces the largest reductions in inequality. This is perhaps not 
surprising in view of the fact that the Gini measure depends on relative incomes (as 
well as on the ranks of individuals), and government expenditure in this example 
involves relatively larger amounts going to the households with children.  
3.3  Progress iv i t y  Measures  
Comparisons between distributions may also involve the use of progressivity 
measures. In view of the use of the standard Gini inequality measure, it is convenient 
to use the Kakwani (1986) progressivity measure. This reflects the disproportionality 
of taxation. It involves the concentration measure of tax payments, which is precisely 
like the Gini inequality measure, except that in ranking the units in ascending order, 
the rank used for tax payments is the same as that used for pre-tax incomes. For 
example, in comparing distributions 3 and 4, the market incomes per adult equivalent 
are, when ranked in ascending order, given by  
[41.5, 48.1, 57.5, 100],  
and the net tax paid (the effect of direct taxes and transfers) by those households is 
[4.16, 0, 11.5, 20].  
The concentration measure of taxation is simply obtained by using the expression for 
the Gini measure in equation (3) above, but keeping the order as in the previous 
sentence. The actual Gini measure of tax payments would of course be obtained by 
arranging households in the order  
[0, 4.16, 11.5, 20].  
 
Another phenomenon, discussed briefly above, arises when the ranking of 
households or individuals changes when moving from pre-tax to post-tax incomes. 
Reranking can be measured by the difference between the Gini measure of post-tax 
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incomes and the (smaller) concentration measure of post-tax incomes. These are 
obviously equal when there is no reranking.  
 
In the present context, where transfer payments and some other government 
expenditure items are allocated, it is not possible to consider progressivity measures 
for all the distributions examined in Table 5. This is because in some cases there are 
negative effective tax payments and the basic Gini and concentration measures 
cannot apply for negative values. Where comparisons are possible, the results are 
shown in Table 6. The tax ratio shown in the final column of the table is defined as 
total (effective) tax payments divided by total pre-tax income.23 
 
 
Table 6 Progressivity Measure 
Before and after Progressivity Reranking Tax ratio 
3 and 4 0.2267 0.0050 0.1443 
5 and 6 0.2252 0.0054 0.1135 
7 and 8 0.2142 0.0060 0.1251 
11 and 12 0.1950 0.0017 0.1250 
 
4  Compar i sons  over  T ime  
The previous sections of this paper have discussed alternative income distribution 
comparisons for a single time period. The fact that the redistributive effect of any tax 
system cannot be evaluated independently of the population (the pre-tax income 
distribution) raises the question of how comparisons can be made over time, where 
typically both the population and the tax structure are different. In fiscal incidence 
studies the question is thus: has the income tax and transfer system become more or 
less redistributive? The difficulty is therefore to isolate the marginal effect of the tax 
policy change from that of the population change.  
                                               
23
  Kakwani (1986) showed that the redistributive effect (the reduction in the Gini inequality measure when moving 
from pre- to post-tax income) is equal to the progressivity measure multiplied by g/(1-g), where g denotes the tax 
ratio, less the reranking measure. This can be confirmed using the results in Tables 5 and 6.  
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Suppose that two cross-sectional household surveys are available. Let iT  denote the 
tax structure for 0,1i =  (an initial period and subsequent period respectively). 
Similarly let iP  denote the population in period i. There are therefore four possible 
Gini inequality measures of both gross market income and disposable income; 
denote these by ( ),m i jG P T  and ( ),d i jG P T  for , 0,1i j = . Indeed, these four Gini 
measures could be obtained using each of the combinations of income concept and 
unit of analysis discussed above. It is assumed here that each survey contains 
enough information about the characteristics of households so that the disposable 
incomes of each population can be computed for each of the tax structures. 
 
To simplify the discussion using the hypothetical households introduced above (and 
minimise the data to be presented), suppose the only difference between the two 
populations is that in the second period there is a fifth household consisting of two 
children and two adults with market incomes of 80 and 20 (so again the households 
all have the same total income). Suppose the second-period disposable incomes are 
as show in Table 7: these may be compared, for the first four households, with those 
in Table 1. The total household disposable incomes are thus  
[78, 78, 100, 87, 102]  
and the disposable incomes per adult equivalent person are  
[78, 45, 48.1, 36.1, 42.3].  
 
Table 7 Individual Gross and Disposable Incomes for Second Tax 
Structure and Second Population 
 Gross market income   Disposable Income 
HH A1 A2 C1 C2  A1 A2 C1 C2 
1 100 - - -  78 - - - 
2 60 40 - -  43 35 - - 
3 75 25 0 -  68 32 0 - 
4 100 0 0 0  87 0 0 0 
5 80 20 0 0  72 30 0 0 
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Consider comparisons using distributions 5 and 6 in Table 4, that is, the distributions 
of income per adult equivalent person, using the individual as unit of analysis. It may 
be tempting to compare the Gini measures of disposable income in each period, 
giving ( )0 0, 0.1171dG P T =  and ( )1 1, 0.1016dG P T = . This comparison would conclude 
that the policy reform has reduced inequality. But this would be a spurious 
comparison. Alternatively, it may be tempting to compare, for the two periods, the 
percentage reduction in the Gini when moving from market to disposable income: in 
this case they are both 17%, suggesting no change in the redistributive effect of 
taxes as a result of the policy change.24 However, the separate effects of tax and 
population changes can be obtained as follows. 
 
In order to identify the appropriate marginal effects of tax policy and population 
changes, it is first useful to consider the following decomposition:25 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0, , , , , ,d d d d d dG P T G P T G P T G P T G P T G P T− = − + −        (4) 
 
The first term in square brackets on the right hand side of (4) is the population effect 
given tax structure 1, and the second term in square brackets is the tax policy effect 
given initial population 0. Appropriate computation for the hypothetical data gives: 
 
 [ ] [ ]0.1016 0.1171 0.1016 0.1220 0.1220 0.1171− = − + −  (5) 
 
The reduction in inequality of disposable income per adult equivalent person is the 
term on the left hand side of (5), that is 0.1016 - 0.1171 = -0.0155. The population 
effect is negative, since 0.1016 – 0.1220 = -0.0204). The policy effect is actually 
positive, since 0.1220 – 0.1171 = 0.0049. Thus the effect of the tax policy change, 
measured using the population of the initial year, is to increase inequality.  
 
                                               
24
  The percentages are rounded to the nearest integer here as in Table 5, but in this case they are equal when given 
to two decimal places, both being 16.65%. 
25  This kind of decomposition can be extended to allow for labour supply responses to the tax policy change, but 
rapidly becomes more complex as the number of decompositions increases. See Bargain (2010) and, for a range 
of extensions including the use of a money metric welfare measure, see Creedy and Hérault (2011).  
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However, there is another possible decomposition of the change in inequality, since:  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0, , , , , ,d d d d d dG P T G P T G P T G P T G P T G P T− = − + −        (6) 
 
The first term in square brackets on the right hand side of (6) is the population effect 
given tax structure 0, while the second term is the tax policy effect given population 
structure 1. Computation gives: 
 
 [ ] [ ]0.1016 0.1171 0.0984 0.1171 0.1016 0.0984− = − + −  (7) 
 
In this case the population effect is again negative (-0.0187) and the policy effect is 
again positive (0.0032). Both effects are smaller in absolute terms but of course give 
the same overall reduction in the Gini measure.26 Faced with two values for each of 
the marginal effects, one approach is to obtain the unweighted arithmetic mean, 
giving a tax policy effect of 0.00405 and a marginal population effect of -0.01955.27 
The overall reduction in inequality of disposable income per adult equivalent person 
in the present example (comparing the second cross-sectional dataset with the first) 
arises because the inequality-reducing marginal effect of the population change 
outweighs the inequality-increasing marginal effect of the tax policy change.  
5  Conc lus ions  
The aim of this paper has been to emphasise the need to avoid spurious 
comparisons of inequality and poverty by paying particular attention to the choice of 
welfare metric (or income concept) and unit of analysis. A wide range of possible 
distributions can be constructed so that great care is needed when making 
comparisons. It is especially important to make explicit the various value judgements 
that are inevitably involved.  
                                               
26
  Computations based on the use of the equivalent person as the unit of analysis (distributions 7 and 8 in Table 4), 
give a percentage reduction in the Gini when moving from market to disposable income in the second period of 
20% (compared with 18%, as shown in Table 5). This could not be used to suggest that the policy change has 
produced a more redistribute tax structure. Use of this alternative unit of analysis produces positive marginal 
policy effects on the change in inequality of disposable income, in agreement with the use of the individual as unit 
(though absolute values are smaller).  
27
 This average is recommended by Shorrocks (2011), who links it to the Shapley Value, familiar from game theory.  
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The paper has concentrated on clarifying the nature of alternative distributions, rather 
than examining the more technical issues relating to formal measures of inequality, 
on which there is a vast literature.  
 
In the literature on inequality measurement, many analytical results regarding 
inequality and tax progressivity have been developed in the context of populations 
consisting of individuals receiving different (exogenous) incomes but otherwise being 
identical. It was found possible to make important connections between clearly stated 
value judgements, such as the principle of transfers, and comparisons of Lorenz and 
Generalised Lorenz curves. Widely used inequality measures could be linked 
explicitly to value judgements and associated social welfare (or evaluation) functions. 
However, in practice the need to deal with heterogeneous individuals and 
households, combined with the sharing of resources within households, has meant 
that applied economists typically deal with somewhat artificial income concepts as 
well as income units.  
 
When the artificial income concept of household income per adult equivalent is used, 
a similarly artificial unit, the equivalent adult, needs to be used as the unit of analysis 
if it is desired to apply all the established welfare results regarding Lorenz curves and 
the principle of transfers. But if an anonymity principle – the value judgement that all 
individuals should ‘count as one’ irrespective of the household to which they belong – 
is instead held, the appropriate unit is the individual. However, in this case the 
principle of transfers can no longer be relied on: indeed it is possible for such an 
approach to be inequality preferring if rich large households are judged to benefit 
from large economies of scale.  
 
Instead of using equivalence scales where equal sharing is implicit, an explicit 
sharing rule could be used to allocate total household income among household 
members. This can be further extended to allow for the assignment of some 
government expenditure to individuals: thus the expenditure is assumed to involve 
publicly funded private goods. It must be recognised that results can depend on the 
sharing rule assumed, and of course the application of a common sharing rule to all 
households is a strong assumption. Furthermore, a comparison of final income with 
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market income involves the artificial income measure obtained by applying the same 
sharing rule to market incomes.  
 
It has also been shown that income distribution comparisons over time, and 
particularly evaluations of tax policy changes, need to be made with care. This is 
because both the population structure (and thus the pre-tax income distribution) and 
the tax policy are subject to changes. However, the marginal effects of each change 
can be computed based on a range of decomposition analyses.  
 
Despite the many problems, there will undoubtedly continue to be much interest in 
inequality and the redistributive role of government. There will therefore continue to 
be a strong demand for the empirical evaluation of policies in terms of their effects on 
inequality. Policies which are designed for quite different purposes may be thought to 
have implications for inequality that need to be explored. Hence applied economists 
cannot afford to be nihilistic. A substantial amount of pragmatism, using measures 
and approaches that have known limitations, is needed in the face of considerable 
complexity and fundamental difficulties, including data and modelling limitations.  
 
It is therefore extremely important to be as clear as possible about the approach 
used, to provide a wide range of results to allow readers to use their own judgement, 
and to exercise caution in interpreting results.  
 
A final additional word of caution is perhaps also warranted. Even if concern were 
purely with market incomes which unambiguously involve the individual as the unit of 
analysis, assessing the impact of taxation is not straightforward, in view of 
endogeneity effects involved. In particular, the tax and transfer structure is designed 
to allow for differences in the demographic structure of households, and individual 
incomes are affected by joint labour supply decisions of partners. Household 
formation and fertility are jointly determined, along with labour supply. Thus pre-tax 
incomes themselves depend on the tax structure, so the term ‘redistributive effect of 
taxes’ must be used with caution. Importantly, a tax change designed to be more 
redistributive may in fact lead to lower inequality of post-tax incomes, but also to 
higher inequality of pre-tax incomes.  
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